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1. The Skeptical Argument  
Consider the following skeptical argument, made popular 
by Nozick (1981). Let p = I have hands, q = I'm not a 
bodiless brain in a vat who is programmed to have 
precisely the sensory experiences I’ve had (henceforth a 
BIV) and K = I know that... . The skeptic argues as follows: 
(1) p  (assumption for reductio) 
(2) (p→q) (Note that having hands im-
plies being not a handless 
BIV.)  
(3) (x)(y)[{Kx ∧ K(x→y)} →Ky]  
    (the closure principle) 
So  (4) Kq   (from (1),(2) and (3)) 
But  (5) ¬Kq  (skeptic’s premise) 
So  (6) ¬Kp   (from (1), (4) and (5)) 
The conclusion is that I don't know that I have hands. By 
analogous reasoning, the skeptic says that I don't know 
that I have legs, etc. (I owe this presentation of the 
skeptical argument to Garrett (1999).) 
The above argument can be put in the following form. 
(7) ¬Kq   (skeptic’s premise) 
(8) ¬Kq → ¬Kp  (which is true under (2)  
                              and (3)) 
So  (9) ¬Kp   (by Modus Ponens) 
DeRose (1995) calls it the "argument from ignorance"(AI). 
Let us represent the skeptical argument in this simpler 
form.  
Dretske (1970) and Nozick (1981) attack (3) which is 
known as the "closure principle". It says that knowledge is 
closed under known logical implication; for any proposition 
x and y, if one knows that x and knows that x entails y, 
then one knows y. Their strategy is to resist skepticism by 
denying closure. Unfortunately there are some persuasive 
criticisms against them (Stine (1975), Forbes (1984), Vogel 
(1990), DeRose (1995), Lewis (1996)). For example, No-
zick uses a counterfactual analysis of knowledge which is 
not flawless (Forbes, 1984). I don’t think that their criticism 
against closure is successful, but I think their basic 
strategy against skepticism (to solve the skeptical puzzle 
by resisting the skeptical hypotheses) is right. In this paper 
I will propose another anti-skeptical argument. My claim is 
that we can escape from skepticism whether closure is 
true or not. In other words, we do not need to determine 
whether closure is true or not for resisting skepticism. 
2. An Argument against Skepticism  
Closure is true or not true. If closure is not true, we can 
escape from skepticism as Dretke and Nozick tell us. Let 
us consider the other case that closure is true. In this case 
we can use a part of the above skeptical argument; from 
(1) to (4). Let us write it again. 
(1) Kp 
(2) K(p→q) 
(3) (x)(y)[{Kx  K(x→y)} →Ky]  
                      (the closure principle) 
So  (4) Kq 
In this argument the closure principle transmits knowledge 
Kp to another Kq as in AI the closure principle transmitting 
ignorance ¬Kq to another ignorance ¬Kp. Let us call the 
above argument the "argument from knowledge"(AK). In 
the present case (3) (closure principle) is true. So we can 
focus on the truth of (1) ((2) seems indisputable). Is it true? 
Do I know that I have hands? 
The truth of (1) depends on the definition of knowledge. 
There are lots of analyses of "I know that p" after Gettier 
(1963). Their purpose is first to escape the so-called 
Gettier's paradox and second to capture our ordinary use 
of the words "to know." It seems natural to require the 
following for the analysis of knowledge.  
(H)  Any analysis of knowledge should make at least 
that "I know that I have hands" is true.  
We would not accept the analysis of knowledge that does 
not satisfy (H). Of course, (1) is true under the definitions 
of “to know” that satisfies (H). Therefore (4) is true under 
the same condition, which means (7) in AI is not true under 
it. So AI can also be rejected in this case. Therefore, we 
also do not need to accept the skeptical conclusion in this 
case. 
3. What the Above Argument Shows and 
What It Does Not 
It shows that we can escape from skepticism under a 
natural requirement for knowledge. It does not show that I 
know I'm not a BIV. It shows just that if closure is true then 
I can say that I know I'm not a BIV under the wide range of 
notions of knowledge. 
Closure was a tool for epistemologists. Gettier (1963) 
used it in his argument for his paradox (according to him, 
justification is closed under justified entailment: for any 
proposition p, if S is justified in believing p and p entails q 
and S deduces q from p and accepts q as a result of this 
deduction, then S is justified in believing q). Afterwards 
skeptics have used it for arguing against them. So closure 
is used by both non-skeptics and skeptics. I used this fact 
in my argument against skepticism. Many non-skeptics 
such as relevant alternatives theorists admit the flaws of 
closure and use its restricted version (for any relevant 
alternative q to a proposition p, if one knows that p and 
knows that p entails not-q, then one knows that not-q. Roth 
and Ross (1990), p.6). I think we don't need such 
concession to skepticism for arguing against it.  
What makes AI plausible? I think AI should be read as 
follows: If "to know" satisfies (7) and (8), then (9) is true 
under the meaning of "to know." Which means that the 
notion of knowledge does not satisfy (H)(“I know that I 
have hands” is false under the notion). So in AI "I know 
that p" means, for example, that I can exclude all logical 
possibilities of not-p. Therefore “I don’t know that I have 




hands” means that I cannot exclude all logical possibilities 
that I don't have hands. I think this does not contradict our 
intuition. It is logically possible that I am a brain in a vat, 
merely dreaming, or being deceived by an evil demon.* 
 
 
* I am grateful to John Gibbons for his suggestive lecture of epistemology at 
MIT in the fall of 2000. 
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